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NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION TO POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY  
 
Towards a political sociology of human rights  
 
There is no doubt that until recently, the study of human rights was completely 
dominated by scholars of law and by political philosophers.  Now sociologists 
(including those located institutionally within the discipline as well as those working 
with sociological concepts in anthropology and International Relations) are beginning 
to make a contribution towards understanding how human rights are developing.  It 
seems evident that working from a sociological perspective that takes seriously 
questions of power and politics, social divisions and conflicts, differences in 
interpretations of human rights and in the conditions of social action needed to realise 
them, enables insights into human rights practices beyond those of positive law and 
normative philosophy.  Much discussion amongst sociologists has, however, turned 
on why the discipline itself has historically neglected questions of rights.  One of the 
main reasons is undoubtedly the now familiar charge of “methodological 
nationalism”, the way in which sociologists have tended to equate “society” as the 
object of their study with the borders of nation-states in a way that precludes 
understanding of social relations and interdependencies across state borders (see Beck 
and Sznaider 2006; Sznaider and Levy 2006).   Interestingly, it is not only the 
growing interest in globalization that now leads to new consideration of human rights; 
it is also that (as we shall discuss below) human rights are themselves globalizing.  In 
general, however, there appears to be a consensus emerging that tendencies towards 
cultural relativism combined with a suspicion of the individualism of rights have 
generally contributed to a lack of sociological interest in human rights.  Studies of 
citizenship, focused on institutions and collectivism, have not faced the same 
difficulties.  Although citizenship and human rights are increasingly entwined (see, 
for example, Soysal 1996; Somers 2008; Nash 2009a), human rights are still less 
concrete, less tied to the nation-state, and to legal facts of membership and 
territoriality than citizenship rights, and they seem, therefore, to raise difficult 
questions of universality, morality and ontology that sociology, formed in terms of 
value-neutrality and relativism, is ill-equipped to address (Turner 1993; Morris 2006; 
Somers and Roberts 2008).   
 
Now that the sociological study of human rights is underway, however, how much of 
an obstacle are relativism and the putative individualism of rights to its development?  
In one of the earliest discussions of human rights in contemporary sociology, Bryan 
Turner has argued that, in order to be go beyond relativism and value-neutral 
positivism, sociologists, and others, should understand the value of human rights as 
founded on an appreciation of common humanity: he suggests that the vulnerability of 
the human body provides the necessary universal basis for human rights (Turner 
1993, 2006).  Similarly, but without making a foundational argument, Blau and 
Moncada argue that sociologists should embrace the moral project of the human rights 
movement, becoming as committed to their realization as any other activists (Blau 
and Moncada 2005).  Neither foundationalism nor activist commitment seems to me 
to be necessary, or desirable, as a condition of the development of the sociology of 
human rights.  In the first place, foundational claims do not seem to be necessary to 
motivate the majority of secular human rights activists (Christians, of course, may 
continue to see human rights as founded in natural law, and other religious groups 
may also human rights as sacred) (Gearty 2006: chapter 2).  One reason why 
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sociologists have become so interested in human rights is their expansion since the 
end of the Cold War, which is due to geo-political contingencies rather than the 
achievement of solid ontological foundations on which to base human rights claims.  
Similarly, sociologists may be convinced of the general validity and value of 
universal human rights and yet be sensitive to the effects of the specificity of their 
historical and geographical origins and how they are mobilized today.  Indeed, it also 
seems clear that uses of human rights are not always of general benefit; we have only 
to consider how arguments for the illegal war in Iraq were couched in terms of human 
rights (Chandler 2006).  Whilst the study of human rights offers a great opportunity to 
study how moral ideals motivate social action, it is also necessary to develop theories 
and methodologies that enable us to gain some critical distance on how they are used 
and institutionalized in a range of different ways.   
 
In practice, most sociologists (and also our fellow travellers in anthropology and IR) 
tend think of human rights as socially constructed (see, for example, Donnelly 1989; 
An’Naim 2002; Kurasawa 2007; Somers 2008; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Goodale and 
Merry 2007).  Studying the social construction of human rights enables us to 
understand how their historically and geographically specific meanings are formed 
and contested, how authority is created or won to define what human rights are and 
should be, and whose rights and obligations are at stake in a particular contest (see 
Nash 2009b: chapters 1 and 2).   This approach to the study of human rights extends 
the concepts and methodologies of sociology to deal with new objects and sites of 
action without requiring that the discipline take a ‘moral’ turn.   
 
In terms of their supposed individualism, there is no doubt that human rights are 
predominantly, though not exclusively, individual rights.  The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations in 1948 and supplemented 
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of 
which entered into force in 1976, are the basis of human rights practice today.  The 
first Articles of the UDHR and the ICCPR concern classic civil rights of the 
individual.  Especially in the West, it is these civil rights that have set the human 
rights agenda, with an emphasis on freedom of speech and association, the prevention 
of wrongful imprisonment, torture, and murder by the state.  These agreements also 
include political rights, the right to participate in government whether directly or 
through representatives.  The UDHR also contains articles specifying social, cultural 
and economic rights in some detail, including the right to education, to a decent 
standard of living, to health care and so on.  It is these that form the basis of the 
ICESCR.  However, although all members of the UN have signed and ratified the 
UDHR, and most (with the glaring exception of the US) have signed and ratified the 
ICESCR, ‘human rights’ in the West is virtually exclusively used to refer to civil 
rights: social, economic and cultural rights tend to be ignored or devalued by Western 
states.  It has, therefore, been difficult for NGOs and developing states to put these 
rights on the agendas of Inter-Governmental Organizations such as the World Bank 
and the G8, and also of the most effective bodies of the UN, notably the Security 
Council.    
 
In fact, even though social rights have been part of the human rights regime since 
1948, it has often been argued, especially throughout the Cold War, that it is only civil 
rights that can really be treated as human rights at all.  Civil rights are seen as 
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negative rights, meaning that they enable the clear identification of specific 
obligations on the part of specific agents to stop acting in certain ways, to stop state 
repression (Donnelly 1989: 33-4).  As such, legal judgement is generally considered 
sufficient to identify and rectify violations of human rights.  In contrast, social, 
economic and cultural rights are positive rights, which require open-ended obligations 
on the part of states to provide resources and benefits that can not be as clearly 
specified, or as easily put into practice, especially where states have very limited 
capacities in terms of a tax base.  From a sociological point of view, however, the 
distinction between negative and positive rights is misleading.  This is not because 
social, economic and cultural rights are more valuable than civil rights, even if it is 
certainly true that without the basic means of subsistence freedoms of speech, protest 
and mobilization are worth nothing.  It is rather that both types of human rights, civil 
rights and social, economic and cultural rights, are equally social: the realization of 
human rights in practice requires the formation of political will, which requires at 
least minimal agreement on the inter-subjective meaning and value of human rights; 
and it also requires specific social institutions to promote, monitor and safeguard the 
ongoing exercise of those rights.  This is no less true of civil rights to individual 
freedom than it is of social rights to education or health-care.  Human rights not to be 
arbitrarily imprisoned and tortured are far from easily put into practice, as we have 
seen all too clearly in the denial of fundamental rights to detainees in Guantanamo 
Bay (Johns 2005; Nash 2009b).  Clearly the fact of a reasonably well-functioning 
liberal-democracy is insufficient to prevent violations of human rights: well-funded, 
professional and highly-motivated human rights organizations and forms of 
communication to put pressure on the judiciary and on the government are crucial to 
remedying human rights violations.  Even where merely ‘negative’ civil rights are 
concerned, then, a wide range of social institutions and the mobilization of collective 
meanings of human rights both outside and inside the state are absolutely necessary to 
ensure that they are upheld.   
 
In broad terms, then, the sociology of human rights involves studying human rights as 
practices, as the ongoing achievements of social action rather than as legally codified 
individual entitlements.  Human rights are social in that they are constructed and 
sustained in ongoing practices that enable us to make sense of our common life and to 
orient our intentions and action in relation to each other.  Human rights are also social 
in that, although they may be claimed by individuals, it is only collective meanings 
and institutions that enable those claims to be in any way effective.  There are 
currently a number of areas in which those studying human rights as social, whether 
or not they identify as sociologists in narrow disciplinary terms, are making important 
contributions to the study of human rights. 
 
Human rights and state transformation 
Human rights are globalizing.  This may seem a strange statement: as human rights 
are universal, they are supposed to apply to all individuals as human beings; surely, 
therefore, they are necessarily global?  Human rights are now globalizing, however, 
insofar as the vast majority of states have now committed themselves to precise and 
detailed international human rights agreements, and human rights activists at the 
international level and within states are working to deepen and extend those 
commitments.  As such the globalization of human rights is part of the wider, and 
continuously changing, pattern of flows of people, goods, images and ideas across 
territorial borders that characterise globalization.  Human rights differ, however, from 
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other such transnational flows, which often call into question states’ capacities to 
manage their own domestic affairs.  Human rights claims are ultimately directed to 
states as the only forms of social organization with the resources and legitimacy to 
properly guarantee human rights.  It is also only state actors (and occasionally those 
who are complicit with them, like multinational corporations in US tort law), who 
may technically be in breach of international human rights law (Meckled-Garcia and 
Cali 2006).  The globalization of human rights therefore adds to states’ 
responsibilities, rather than undermining them, and so it contributes to state 
transformation.   
 
Modern states were established in accordance with the legal convention of 
‘sovereignty’, which regulates affairs between states as discrete and (even if they are 
actually unable to maintain their autonomy) as each one in principle independent from 
the others.  The history of ‘sovereignty’ is highly complex; established in principle in 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it was extended to European colonies only in the 
twentieth century.  The UDHR was actually created at the high point of the ideal of 
sovereignty, and upholds it as a legal convention: it is state parties that agree to 
uphold and respect universal human rights (see Nash 2010: XX-XX).  With the 
globalization of human rights, however, ‘sovereignty’ is coming under pressure, albeit 
pressure that is unevenly distributed following existing geopolitical fault-lines.  The 
‘thickening’ of international legal agreements and the complex arrangements into 
which states enter in order to draw up those agreements and to organise their 
implementation, monitoring and, where necessary, their supplementation with other 
agreements, is transforming states as such.  As Slaughter argues, states are now 
disaggregating across borders, as government regulators, judges and legislators 
network with their counterparts from other states and from supranational institutions 
like the EU, in order to share information, harmonize regulation and develop ways of 
enforcing international law (Slaughter 2004; see also Held 1995).  Similarly, Sassen 
has analysed how, in specific cases, the work of national legislatures and judiciaries is 
now caught up in processes of globalization which ‘re-orient particular components of 
institutions and specific practices…  towards global logics and away from historically 
shaped national logics’ (Sassen 2006: 2).  What is most significant in this respect is 
the scale at which human rights claims are made.  As we shall discuss further in the 
following section, transnational advocacy networks mobilize and act at both 
international and national levels, often drawing on both international and national law 
and addressing state officials in international and national courts and governments as 
appropriate.  Indeed, human rights are very often ‘intermestic’, both international and 
domestic at the same time.  The chief example is when customary international law is 
used in national courts, confirming and extending its status as law whilst binding the 
national state to its observance in the particular case in question (see Nash 2009b: 32-
40).  It is through such practices that the state is transformed.  Indeed, sovereignty 
itself is potentially altered in this way.  It would be mistaken to see sovereignty as 
obsolete, or as justified now only insofar as states adopt the responsibility to protect 
human rights (see Bickerton et al. 2007).  On the contrary, the contestation of state 
sovereignty, linked to ideals of democracy as popular sovereignty, is crucial to 
mobilizations against the extension of human rights.  However, there is no doubt that, 
especially in international settings, the responsibility to uphold human rights is 
important; it now co-exists, and is often in conflict with, traditional justifications of 
sovereignty as the ultimate guarantee of state security (Sznaider and Levy 2006; Nash 
2009a: chapter 3).   
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Human rights organizations, legalization and the limits of law 
If human rights are ultimately secured only through states, what is invariably also 
crucial is the pressure political and legal advocacy organizations put on governments 
and the judiciary to uphold the international human rights agreements to which states 
have committed themselves in principle.  Just as states are being ‘stretched’ through 
the globalization of human rights, so too human rights organizations, even those that 
operate within states, are now invariably linked into global networks.  Indeed, in cases 
where states are extremely repressive, such organizations may survive only because of 
the way they are supported across national borders; they certainly can not succeed 
without such networks.  Commonly, domestic human rights organizations bypass their 
own repressive states and search out international allies – INGOs and/or 
representatives of state actors that are powerfully positioned in IGOs, – by means of 
which pressure can be brought to bear on state elites from above and below.  If such 
organizations are successful, and it may take many years to make a difference, 
eventually state elites will alter their behaviour to comply with international human 
rights norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999).  In many cases, of course, 
human rights organizations are not successful and state elites continue either to deny, 
ignore, or, occasionally, to offer justifications for the human rights violations for 
which they are responsible, whilst ordinary people are also often willing to ignore or 
deny what they know to be happening (Cohen 2001). 
   
Why do organizations have such difficulty in successfully bringing pressure to bear 
on states, even when they have signed up to international agreements which 
ostensibly commit them to accepting responsibility for guaranteeing human rights?  
There is no doubt that law is important to securing human rights, but it is clearly not 
enough, neither at the international nor the national level.  One reason for the 
inadequacy of law in this respect is that human rights law itself is somewhat 
ambiguous: although it is predominantly concerned with protecting the civil rights of 
the individual, it has been crafted by state elites who have the aim of protecting the 
very existence of the state itself.  State security remains a dominant consideration for 
state elites.  This is very clearly seen, for example, in the fact that the traditional state 
prerogative to suspend law in times of national emergency is explicitly enabled in 
international human rights law.  This means that, under certain conditions, states may 
legally detain individuals without proper procedures of law just at the point at which 
‘suspicious individuals’, often members of racialized ethnic minorities, are likely to 
be the victims of a state supported by a majority fearful for its safety (Agamben 2005; 
Rajagopal 2003: 176-182; Gearty 2006).  In addition, again, as we have seen in the 
case of those arbitrarily detained and tortured in Guantanamo Bay, even where the 
law appears to be absolutely clear in prohibiting certain state actions, and even in 
states which are apparently well-regulated by the rule of law, responsibility for human 
rights can quite easily be evaded by professional legal obfuscation.  Detainees were 
incarcerated in Guantanamo without recourse to courts that were recognised as 
legitimate by international human rights organizations from 2001 until 2008, when 
after lengthy and hugely elaborate legal proceedings the US Supreme Court finally 
ruled that their cases should be tried in civilian courts (see Nash 2009b: chapter 3).  
 
The law is important, then, to respect for human rights, but even when the law is well-
established and there are reasonably well-functioning institutions to put it into 
practice, it is far from enough.  The law itself does not stand outside or above social 
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life: what the law means depends on how it is socially constructed and on how actors 
are able to win the authority to definitively pronounce on its meaning.  The law is 
itself social; whether and how the law is institutionalized is a factor in how well 
human rights ideals are realized in any particular case, but it is just one factor amongst 
others.  The codification of human rights in international law is important in that it 
may enable organizations to formulate concrete and specific demands of states, which 
may then be supported by other influential actors in the human rights field.  But a 
sociology of human rights that focuses on how organizations actually succeed, and 
fail, to put human rights ideals into practice displaces law as the main focus of 
research into human rights: its focus will be at least as much on the limits of law as 
such, and on the other important factors that are necessary to realise human rights.     
 
Subjectivity and solidarity  
If sociologists of human rights are concerned with the ways in which the social 
institutions of citizenship and the state are being altered by particular uses of human 
rights, they are also concerned with the effects of uses of human rights on cultural 
formations, especially on the inter-subjective sense of how ‘we’ experience political 
community.  One of the main areas of debate in this respect is the question of how far 
uses of human rights are contributing to cosmopolitan identities, to disengaging from 
the nation, the dominant form of organization of political community in modernity, 
and to experiencing oneself as part of ‘humanity’, as a human being amongst other 
human beings.  Here questions of collectivism and individualism are debated 
explicitly in relation to uses of human rights.   
  
Kurasawa’s (2007) study of global practices of human rights suggests that they may 
be producing new forms of unity and solidarity, piecemeal and from the ‘bottom up’.  
A principal fear of those working on cosmopolitanism and human rights, however, is 
that, because of the emphasis of human rights practices on individual rights, they are 
rather more likely to exacerbate the individualizing effects of neo-liberalism (Beck 
2006; Bauman 1999), and to undermine still further experiences of national solidarity 
on which policies of redistribution through the welfare state have depended (Turner 
2002).  It is surely the case that, for the most part those who practice ‘cosmopolitan 
virtues’ of disengagement from the nation are likely to be the more privileged in 
society, those Calhoun has called ‘frequent flyer cosmopolitans’ (Calhoun 2003).   
 
Although Kurasawa’s view that transnational communities are being formed around 
victimisation and the remedying of human rights wrongs is important, it may also be 
that the imagined community of the nation, far from becoming out-dated as a result of 
creative uses of human rights, is at the same time becoming important in new social 
conflicts over resources, both material and moral.  In fact this is what I found in my 
comparative study of uses of human rights in the US and UK.  It is only really human 
rights activists who now understand human rights as already having established a kind 
of global citizenship, and who identify as members of a global political community in 
which rights and obligations are clearly specified.  These activists are generally 
members of transnational human rights organizations.  For the most part, human 
rights issues are framed in terms of the interests and values of the nation; even where 
it is strongly argued that human rights should be respected, this is quite often seen as a 
question of national pride and/or national shame rather than in terms of global 
citizenship or universal morality as such.  In the cases I studied it seemed that national 
identities were being reworked, even revivified, in the context of globalizing human 
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rights, not necessarily against human rights, as we might expect, but often in quite 
unexpected ways to justify upholding the moral equality of persons who were not 
citizens, and who were sometimes not even resident within the territory of the state in 
question (Nash 2009b).   
 
Comparative political sociology of human rights 
It is common as a sociologist working on human rights to be asked whether or not you 
are yourself in favour of human rights.  I have argued here that it is unnecessary to 
establish an ontological and moral foundation for human rights in order to study them 
sociologically, and also that is important not to assume that human rights are 
necessarily a progressive force for justice.  This professional scepticism need not 
preclude personal support for the universality of human rights, but it does mean that 
what the sociologist must advocate is close empirical investigation of each instance of 
their use before reaching judgement.  On the other hand, the theoretical aim of the 
sociology of human rights as I have outlined it here, to investigate how social 
constructions of human rights are formed, mobilized and defended, would seem to 
militate against, even potentially undermine, their moral worth as universals.  What 
remains of the universality of human rights when social constructions are so various, 
and so specific to social actors who mobilize in any given context?  Does the 
sociological perspective on human rights contribute to value relativism in terms of its 
public impact, and potentially, therefore, to undermining support for human rights 
altogether?   
 
This is a difficult question, but it can not be avoided.  From a methodological point of 
view what makes human rights distinctive as an object of sociological study is lost if 
we are unable to take into account not only the variety of empirical uses to which 
‘human rights’ is put, but also the way they are intended to protect and sustain all 
human beings, regardless of where and how they live.  In addition, it is the value of 
human rights that motivates its advocates.  In other words, if we treat ‘human rights’ 
as nothing more than the empirical uses to which the term is put, we lose sight of the 
quasi-transcendental, moral value of human rights, which is what makes them 
politically distinctive and – at least in part – motivates those who are actively trying to 
extend and secure human rights.   
 
One solution to this problem could be to consider the positive law of international 
human rights as providing a universal framework against which any particular uses of 
human rights might be assessed.  In this way ‘human rights’ apparently become a 
neutral object of study (see, for example, Landman 2006: 5).  But this methodological 
strategy begs a number of questions.  Firstly, as we have seen, there are serious 
lacunae in the law of human rights where state repression of individuals may actually 
be legal under certain conditions – where individuals may be imprisoned without due 
process of law in cases of declared states of emergency.  And secondly, whilst there is 
apparently a reasonable degree of consensus on the value of international human 
rights law, judging by the number of states who have signed and ratified human rights 
agreements, there remain vigorous disagreements on which aspects of this body of 
law should be emphasised and prioritised.  Most obviously, there is sharp 
disagreement between the US and many developing countries, including China, on the 
relative value of civil and political rights on one hand, and social and economic rights 
on the other (Woodiwiss 2003).   
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One way for sociologists to approach the study of human rights as social 
constructions whilst nevertheless retaining a view of the significance of their quasi-
transcendental, universal status, is through comparison across different contexts.  In 
fact, the question of the extent to which particular uses of human rights militate 
against, mitigate, or alternatively actively encourage the repression of particular 
groups in society is one that implies comparison with human rights ideals and 
legalized human rights norms, but this is rarely made explicit.  Qualitative comparison 
must be carried out case by case, it is difficult because the relevant standards of 
comparisons must emerge through the course of the research rather than being 
specified completely in advance, not least because there must be sensitivity to 
differences as well as similarities between cases, and it is therefore extremely time-
consuming.  Qualitative comparison is a solution to the potential erosion of the value 
of human rights that is a danger in social constructionist approaches, however, insofar 
as it enables, even compels, assessment of universal human rights claims both in their 
own terms and relative to the uses of human rights in comparable cases, whether of 
other states or of other groups within the same state.   
 
As normative standards, human rights raise very particular theoretical and 
methodology difficulties for political sociology.  But at the same time they offer 
significant opportunities to expand the scope of sociology, to take normative 
dimensions of social life seriously as such rather than trying to neutralize them (by 
conflating human rights and positive law, for example), or evading them (either by 
passionate advocacy of human rights norms, or by refusing to engage with their value 
as universals at all).    
 
Human rights are political 
What this brief outline has shown, I hope, is the relevance of the sociological 
imagination to the study of human rights.  As human rights are social, and not merely 
legal, a sociological perspective is necessary to understanding what difference uses of 
human rights are making to individuals and to collective life today.  Although I have 
been writing about ‘sociology’ very generally in this chapter, following most of the 
commentators in this area, I actually want to argue for a political sociology of human 
rights, as dimensions of power and politics are so crucial to their realization and to 
unintended consequences of attempts to put them into practice.  To conclude, then, I 
will briefly attend explicitly to the political dimensions of human rights.   
 
Human rights are political both in the narrower and the broader sense of the term.  
They are political in the narrow sense in that they almost invariably concern the state.  
Indeed, the international law of human rights is clear (as we noted above): it is only 
state actors (and in some cases those who are complicit with them) who violate human 
rights.  The same acts carried out by private persons may be morally wrong and/or 
criminal in national or international law, but in legal terms they are not strictly human 
rights violations.  In legal terms what is in question in human rights cases is how 
social actors who hold positions such that they are authorised to act ‘in the name of 
the state’ enable, permit, or fail to prevent human rights violations by mis-use of law 
and policy and/or by diffusing responsibility for the harm that is done to individuals 
through hierarchical bureaucratic structures.  I have argued here against taking a 
perspective on human rights that simply follows international law, but the 
institutionalization and effects of law in this area are an important topic for the 
sociology of human rights.  In addition, it is also important to note that human rights 
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claims are invariably addressed to states: it is only through states, with their 
concentration of the means of force and capacities to amass and distribute resources 
that no other social organizations approximate, that can ultimately guarantee the 
security and welfare of all that human rights ideals promise   
 
Human rights are also political in the broader sense of the term, involving the 
contestation of existing power relations and the articulation of new political visions.  
In this respect, what is sometimes referred to as ‘the politics of politics’, the remaking 
of the state as the site of ‘normal’ politics, is especially important to social forms of 
human rights.  If human rights are socially constructed, the task of sociologists is to 
understand how particular definitions of human rights become established.  Who 
decides what human rights are and should be? Who has which entitlements? And how 
these conflicts are to be settled?  Legitimate conflicts in the human rights field are 
ended temporarily, if not finally resolved, through authoritative definitions that decide 
the limits and scope of how they are to be administered.  As the result of these 
contestations is often regulation, policy or law, this understanding of the ‘human 
rights field’ links micro-social interactions to macro-institutional structures, conflicts 
over particular human rights cases to fundamental changes in state formation.   
 
Finally, there is also a good argument to be made for treating human rights as 
inherently political, rather than as moral and foundational.  As Michael Ignatieff has 
argued most forcibly, it is only where human rights are treated as one set of political 
tools among others in campaigns to bring about a more peaceful and just world that 
they stand a chance of being effective.  Where human rights are treated as moral 
‘trumps’, which admit of no discussion or compromise over their limits in a particular 
case, they can lead rather to an intensification of disputes, as well as to the pre-
emption of democracy by an international elite of lawyers, judges and advocacy 
organizations (Ignatieff 2001).  It is in this respect that, rather than acting directly as 
human rights advocates, sociologists comparing different cases in order to establish 
when and how human rights are effective may contribute to their realization as 
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